### The Importance of Technology in Banking during a Crisis

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IMF WP title "Tech in Fin before FinTech: Blessing or Curse for Financial Stability?"

#### November 13, 2020

<sup>1</sup>Disclaimer: The views expressed in the paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or its Management

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## Information Technology in Finance

IT more and more present in finance and lending, e.g.

- machine learning
- more info available (e.g. digital footprint)

• ...

As witnesses by world-wide surge in FinTech and...

- *"We see ourselves as a technology company with a banking license"* Michael Corbat (Citibank CEO, 2014)
- *"We are a technology company"* Marianne Lake (JPMorgan Chase CFO, 2016)
- "We want to be a tech company with a banking license" Ralph Hamers (ING CEO, 2017)
- many many more...

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Information Technology and Financial Stability

FinTech lit. cannot help too much

• FinTech not exposed yet to large shocks, FinTech lending still small in most countries and not representative

In this paper we

- estimate IT Adoption across US banks before the GFC
- look at low- and high- IT adopters during (and after) the GFC
- focus on NPLs, mortgage delinquency, and lending

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The sign of the relationship between IT and Financial Stability is ambiguous

Positive

- IT allows to gather, store, and distribute info (Petersen and Liberti, 2018)
- IT allows the use of more sophisticated statistical models
- ullet  $\Rightarrow$  better screening and monitoring

Negative

- might neglect info difficult to quantify , e.g. "soft" info (Rajan, Seru, Vig; 2015)
- statistical models trained during good times may fail during crisis
- IT may encourage moral hazard through securitization and other fin innovation

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### Measuring IT adoption

Survey data from Aberdeen (previously Harte Hanks)

- used in many seminal papers on IT-adoption (non-financial)
  - e.g. Beaudry et al., 2010 JPE; Bloom et al., 2012 AER; Bresnahan et al., 2002 QJE
- plant (branch) level PCs/Employee in the US in 1999, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2016
- highly correlated with IT budget and adoption of new technologies (Cloud Computing) for 2016, 65% (don't have these other measures before)

Map bank branches to the bank-level and

- bank-level IT adoption = average pre-GFC branch IT after controlling for county FEs and branch size (we also standardize)
- merge with regulatory Data on BHC, e.g. NPLs, assets, loans, wholsale funding

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NPLs and IT adoption: Panel Regression

$$NPL_{b,t} = \alpha_b + \delta_t + \beta IT_b \cdot crisis + (X_b \cdot crisis_t)'\gamma + \epsilon_{b,t}$$
(1)

#### Table: Panel Regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3) NPLs	(4)	(5)
IT-adoption	-0.0239 (0.017)		-0.0283 (0.018)		
crisis	0.811** (0.349)	0.793** (0.346)			
$\text{IT-adoption} \times \text{crisis}$	-0.160** (0.063)	-0.168** (0.065)	-0.157** (0.066)	-0.170** (0.068)	-0.143** (0.063)
N	4608	4608	4608	4608	4608
Bank FE		×		×	×
Year FE			×	×	×
Controls					×

Robustness

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$$NPL_{b,t} = \alpha_b + \delta_t + \sum_{\tau \neq 2006} \beta_\tau IT_b \cdot \mathbf{1}[t = \tau] + \epsilon_{b,t}$$



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### Spurious Correlation?

IT correlated with other predictors of NPLs?

- measures of ex-ante exposure to GFC
  - pre-GFC ratios of loans, capital, and wholesale to assets, ROA, size, wages, and exposure to house-price drop
- no correlation with IT adoption  $\Rightarrow$  unlikely to be correlated with unobservable characteristics predicting expusure to GFC
- no higher ROA or wages  $\Rightarrow$  do not seem better managed or higher human capital
- impact of IT on NPLs unaffected by including important controls
  - $\rightarrow$  coefficient stability to formally test for bias from unobservable variables (Altonji et al.2005, Oster 2019)

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#### Cross Sectional Results + Falsification

	NPLs	Loans	HP Exposure	Size	Capital	Wholesale	ROA	Log Wage
	during GFC	pre-GFC		pre-GFC	pre-GFC	pre-GFC	pre-GFC	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
IT-adoption	-0.183***	-0.648	-0.896	-0.0931	-0.195	-0.0459	-0.0282	-0.0227
	(0.061)	(0.700)	(0.664)	(0.057)	(0.420)	(0.372)	(0.049)	(0.018)
R-squared	0.0262	0.00220	0.00550	0.00712	0.000427	0.0000383	0.00107	0.00414
N	337	337	337	337	337	337	337	337
Mean	1.54	62.69	15.83	13.9	13.02	15.92	2.55	4.84
Std.Dev.	1.13	13.8	12.06	1.1	9.43	7.41	.86	.35

Coefficient stability + local spillovers

### Roots of IT Adoption: Executives' Backgrounds

Most of the variation in branch-level IT adoption is driven by bank characteristics (60% of explained variation)

- conjecture: top executives with more tech-prone background  $\Rightarrow$  overcome frictions that prevent banks from adopting IT
- text analysis to flag technology background of pre-GFC bank executives:
  - bios of CEO, CFO, COO, President from S&P Global MI before 2007
  - search for tech-related words
  - compute an executives' "tech-orientation" score

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$$Y_b = \alpha + \beta \cdot ExeclT_b + \epsilon_b \tag{2}$$

#### Table: NPLs, IT adoption, and Executives' "tech-orientation"

Dependent Variable:	NPLs	NPLs	IT adoption
	during GFC	during GFC	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
IT adoption	-0.138*		
	(0.076)		
Executives' "tech orientation"		0 155***	0.0000*
Executives tech-orientation		-0.155	0.0900
		(0.047)	(0.051)
R-squared	0.0141	0.0210	0.00967
N	249	249	249

#### Robustness

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#### Just better managers?

#### Table: Executives' "tech-orientation" and Compensation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	NPLs	NPLs	IT-adoption	IT-adoption
Executives' "tech-orientation"	-0.173***	-0.168***	0.104*	0.104*
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Log Compensation		-0.0375		-0.00208
		(0.060)		(0.053)
R-squared	0.0226	0.0244	0.0136	0.0136
Ν	237	237	149	149

Use compensation as proxy for human capital

- adding as control doesn't affect results
- more paid executives did not promote IT nor lowered NPLs

Figure: Time-varying Effect of tech-background of executives on NPLs



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| = ৩৭ে 14 / 20 Roots of IT adoption: The Land-grant colleges

Established in 19th century in all US States to provide technical education

- students more likely to major in technical subjects and less likely to major in business and management sciences
- location of colleges does not predict the presence of BHC headquarters in a county

Conjecture: banks whose headquarters are closer to these colleges have generally a higher level of IT adoption

- $\bullet \ \Rightarrow \mathsf{Use as IV}$
- look at different specifications (many instrument settings  $\rightarrow$  LASSO)
- results: qualitatively similar than OLS, larger in magnitude but not statistically different in most cases

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### How did high IT adopters contain the surge in NPLs?

Risk-shifting or more resilient loans?

- loan-level Data from Freddie Mac
- performance during the crisis of mortgages issued before the crisis and securitized
- detailed loan-level characteristics, such as LTV, DTI, Credit Score, postal code, and origiantion year

$$Delinquent_{I} = \alpha_{z(I)} + \delta_{o(I)} + \beta IT_{b(I)} + X'_{I}\gamma + \eta_{I}$$

Dependent Variable:	Delinquency during GFC						
	S	hare of mon	ths with past	t due>90 da	ys		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)		
IT adoption	-0.471**	-0.459**	-0.348**	-0.323**			
	(0.191)	(0.169)	(0.145)	(0.118)			
FICO score				-2.578***	-1.125***		
				(0.284)	(0.181)		
DTI				0.565***	0.248***		
				(0.052)	(0.022)		
LTV				1.075***	0.543***		
				(0.129)	(0.056)		
IT adoption $\times$ Low FICO					-0.198***		
					(0.064)		
IT adoption $\times$ High FICO					-0.00732		
0					(0.029)		
Estimation Method	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS		
Org. Year FE		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Postal Code FE			Yes	Yes	Yes		
N	3,451,671	3,451,671	3,451,671	3,451,671	3,451,671		
Mean	3.44	3.44	3.44	3.44	3.44		
Std.Dev. of dept. var.	14.32	14.32	14.32	14.32	14.32		

#### Table: Loan-Level Regressions

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#### Does IT matter for lending?



Figure: Loans over pre-crisis Assets by pre-GFC IT-adoption

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### Conclusion

In this paper

- we measure the heterogeneous degree of IT-adoption of US commercial banks before the GFC
- high-IT-adopters experienced a significantly smaller increase in NPLs
- also, originated more resilient loans pre-GFC
- several pieces indicating direct role of IT adoption strengthening bank resilience

Why do these findings matter for today's debate? (different technologies...)

- danger of "this time is different" approach
- several commonalities with FinTech in lending
  - machine learning techniques are more powerful versions of the previously available statistical tools
  - digital footprint vs FICO score
- our measure predictive of others IT adoption metrics in 2016 (IT budget, adoption of Cloud Computing)

# APPENDIX

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Dependent Variable: NPLs								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$IT \times crisis$	-0.165**	-0.243*	-0.158**	-0.161**	-0.242**	-0.214**	-0.380*	-0.165***
	(0.068)	(0.120)	(0.069)	(0.063)	(0.095)	(0.080)	(0.183)	(0.051)
Exercise	Baseline	PCs per Emp	HW IT	HW NPLs	Loans	Broad def.	As of 2006	Bank Clustering
R-squared	0.00944	0.00376	0.00794	0.0108	0.00867	0.00993	0.00530	0.00944
N	4692	5035	4692	4692	4692	4692	4655	4692
Bank FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

#### Table: Robustness of Main Panel Regression

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technology, engineering, math, computer, machine, system, analytic, technique, method, process, stem, efficiency, efficient, software, hardware, data, informatic

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Figure: Robustness of the Executives' results to changes in the keywords list





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## Coefficient Stability

Dependent Variable:	NPLs during GFC		
	(1)	(2)	
IT-adoption	-0.183***	-0.157***	
	(0.061)	(0.058)	
R-squared	0.0262	0.243	
Ν	33	37	
Mean	1.54		
Std.Dev.	1.13		
Other Controls included		Yes	

- coefficient is stable although R-squared goes up by 10 times: we perform an omitted variable bias test (Altonji et al.2005, Oster 2019) and find no bias
  - $\Rightarrow$  results point towards IT itself as the cause of the negative relationship

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### Cross Sectional Results + Local Spillover

Dependent Variable:	NPLs during GFC	IT of local competitors	NPLs during GFC (3)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
IT-adoption	-0.183*** (0.061)	0.275*** (0.083)	-0.157*** (0.058)
IT of local competitors			0.0773 (0.047)
R-squared	0.0262	0.0750	0.243
Ν	337	337	337
Mean	1.54	0	1.54
Std.Dev.	1.13	1	1.13
Other Controls included			Yes

• no statistically significant local spillover

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### **IV** Regressions

	Dependent Variable: NPLs during GFC					
	OLS	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
Instrument(s)		5 closest	All	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
IT adoption	-0.183***	-0.949*	-0.301**	-0.837**	-0.541**	-0.546**
	(0.055)	(0.489)	(0.127)	(0.350)	(0.230)	(0.241)
Ν	337	337	337	337	337	337
P-value: $IV = OLS$		0.117	0.353	0.0619*	0.118	0.132
Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
State FEs	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
F-stat of First Stage		2.192	9.948	14.06	12.42	10.76
Cragg-Donald Wald F		1.258	1.081	22.959	17.509	5.817
Stock and Yogo's value		10.83	10.99	16.38	16.38	16.38

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Dependent Variable :		Loan Growt	h (crisis)	
NPLs during the GFC	-0.926***	-1.030***		
	(0.159)	(0.187)		
IT-adoption			0.378** (0.182)	0.331* (0.196)
R-squared	0.0127	0.0928	0.0961	0.175
Ν	343	336	343	336
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

#### Table: Lending Regressions

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#### Literature and Contributions

**FinTech**: e.g. Fuster et al. (2019); Berg et al. (2019); Di Maggio and Yao (2018) and many more...

• Impact of technology adoption on outcomes during systemic crisis

**IT** adoption in other industries: e.g. Beaudry et al. (2010); Bresnahan et al. (2002); Bloom et al. (2012); McElheran and Forman (2019)

• Focus on financial industry and financial stability

**IT** in banking before the GFC and the "profitability paradox": e.g. Beccali (2007); Berger (2003); Koetter and Noth (2013)

• Different methodology, focus on financial stability, provide explanation for "profitability paradox"

Defaults and NPLs in crises: e.g. Mian and Sufi (2009, 2011); Adelino et al. (2016)

• Role of lenders' technology

**Executives and firm outcomes**: e.g. Benmelech and Frydman (2015); Bertrand and Schoar (2003)

· Impact of executives' "tech-orientation" on IT and NPLs

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#### Magnitude

One standard deviation higher IT adoption  $\Rightarrow$  17-13 basis points less NPLs in 2007-2010

- 9 to 11% of mean NPLs (150 bp)
- 12 to 15% of std.dev. (113 bp)

If all banks were at the 75  $^{th}$  percentile of IT adoption  $\Rightarrow$ 

- increase of NPLs lower by 6.5 to 8.5 basis points
- 6 to 8% smaller increase (actual number is 105 bp)