Article 109

1.  Member States shall ensure that, where the resolution authorities take resolution action, and provided that that action ensures that depositors continue to have access to their deposits, the deposit guarantee scheme to which the institution is affiliated is liable for:

(a) when the bail-in tool is applied, the amount by which covered deposits would have been written down in order to absorb the losses in the institution pursuant to point (a) of Article 46(1), had covered deposits been included within the scope of bail-in and been written down to the same extent as creditors with the same level of priority under the national law governing normal insolvency proceedings; or

(b) when one or more resolution tools other than the bail-in tool is applied, the amount of losses that covered depositors would have suffered, had covered depositors suffered losses in proportion to the losses suffered by creditors with the same level of priority under the national law governing normal insolvency proceedings.

In all cases, the liability of the deposit guarantee scheme shall not be greater than the amount of losses that it would have had to bear had the institution been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings.

When the bail-in tool is applied, the deposit guarantee scheme shall not be required to make any contribution towards the costs of recapitalising the institution or bridge institution pursuant to point (b) of Article 46(1).

Where it is determined by a valuation under Article 74 that the deposit guarantee scheme’s contribution to resolution was greater than the net losses it would have incurred had the institution been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, the deposit guarantee scheme shall be entitled to the payment of the difference from the resolution financing arrangement in accordance with Article 75.

2.  Member States shall ensure that the determination of the amount by which the deposit guarantee scheme is liable in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article complies with the conditions referred to in Article 36.

3.  The contribution from the deposit guarantee scheme for the purpose of paragraph 1 shall be made in cash.

4.  Where eligible deposits at an institution under resolution are transferred to another entity through the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool, the depositors have no claim under Directive 2014/49/EU against the deposit guarantee scheme in relation to any part of their deposits at the institution under resolution that are not transferred, provided that the amount of funds transferred is equal to or more than the aggregate coverage level provided for in Article 6 of Directive 2014/49/EU.

5.  Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 to 4, if the available financial means of a deposit guarantee scheme are used in accordance therewith and are subsequently reduced to less than two thirds of the target level of the deposit guarantee scheme, the regular contribution to the deposit guarantee scheme shall be set at a level allowing for reaching the target level within six years.

In all cases, the liability of a deposit guarantee scheme shall not be greater than the amount equal to 50 % of its target level pursuant to Article 10 of Directive 2014/49/EU. Member States, may, by taking into account the specificities of their national banking sector, set a percentage which is higher than 50 %.

In any circumstances, the deposit guarantee scheme’s participation under this Directive shall not exceed the losses it would have incurred in a winding up under normal insolvency proceedings.