

Hedging Securities and Silicon Valley Bank Idiosyncrasies

Raymond Kim
2023 EBA Policy Research Workshop

November 8, 2023

Silicon Valley Bank's Zero Hedge Strategy

- ▶ In a rising interest rate environment. . .

The image shows a screenshot of two news articles. The top article is from the Financial Times, dated March 13, 2023, at 10:45 AM. The headline is "Silicon Valley Bank Dropped a Hedge Against Rising Rates in 2022" by Elliot Brown. The bottom article is from American Banker, dated March 09, 2023, at 3:38 p.m. EST. The headline is "SVB shares fall sharply after \$1.8B in surprise bond losses" by Polo Rocha. Both articles discuss Silicon Valley Bank's zero-hedge strategy in a rising interest rate environment.

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Mar. 13, 2023 at 10:45 AM ★

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By *Elliot Brown*

AMERICAN BANKER.

COMMERCIAL BANKING

SVB shares fall sharply after \$1.8B in surprise bond losses

By *Polo Rocha* March 09, 2023, 3:38 p.m. EST 5 Min Read

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How crazy was Silicon Valley Bank's zero-hedge strategy?

Not as nuts as you might think, but pretty nuts

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 - ▶ SVB amassed \$124B in its bond securities portfolio... with zero hedges

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- Financial Times:** A dark blue box with the text "Make sense of it all. Become an FT subscriber" and a button "+ Add to myFT". Below this, the headline reads "How crazy was Silicon Valley Bank's zero-hedge strategy?" with a sub-headline "Not as nuts as you might think, but pretty nuts".
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The Southern Arizona University logo is in the bottom right corner, with the text "A. A. Franke" and "3 of Business" below it.

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 - ▶ March 8, 2023: SVB lost \$1.8B selling \$21B Available-for-Sale portfolio
 - ▶ Same day, announced a \$2.25B equity offering, which failed
 - ▶ By the end of March 9, SVB stock tanked 60% and uninsured depositors rushed to withdraw funds

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
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- ▶ Did other banks hedge their security losses in their HTM/AFS portfolios?


How Do Banks Hedge Interest Rate Risk?

- ▶ Bank enters receive floating swap, Fed Funds/SOFR + 400 bps




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
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
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
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
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
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- ▶ Do other banks sell their hedges when rates rise?



Banks **INCREASE** Hedging as HTM Losses Rise


- ▶ Aggregated HTM Losses for Banks below \$250B in assets



(a) Total Held-to-Maturity Losses vs Hedging IRDs

Banks **INCREASE** Hedging as AFS Losses Rise

- ▶ Aggregated AFS Losses for Banks below \$250B in assets



(a) Total Available-for-Sale Losses vs Hedging IRDs

Do Banks Systematically Make SVB's Mistake? First Glance Suggests... No

1. Banks are expected to hedge as HTM/AFS Losses \uparrow (rates \uparrow)

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3. Banks actively hedge HTM/AFS Losses when funding risks are present (uninsured deposits)

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
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 - ▶ What about uninsured deposits that act more like short-term liabilities?

Data & Hedging Activity Variables

- ▶ Drop banks over \$250 billion in assets



Data & Hedging Activity Variables

- ▶ Schedule RC-L (Derivatives and Off-Balance Sheet Items)
 - ▶ Call Reports (2015Q1-2022Q4) list trading and hedging interest rate derivatives separately
- ▶ HTM/AFS Losses = Amortized - Fair Value of Securities
- ▶ 10Y Swap Rates, 10Y Treasury Rates
- ▶ 6,539 unique banks with 1,884 banks using hedging IRD

Summary of Hedging vs. Non-Hedging Banks

- ▶ Hedging banks are larger and riskier

| Variables | Hedging N=39,110 | | Non-Hedging N=136,583 | | Mean |
|----------------------------|---------------------|--------|--------------------------|-------|------------|
| | Mean | SD | Mean | SD | Difference |
| Total Assets (\$M) | 4,360 | 12,000 | 481 | 2,500 | 3,879*** |
| Hedging IRD (%) | 6.00 | 10.66 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 6.00*** |
| Trading IRD (%) | 1.22 | 4.69 | 0.13 | 1.43 | 1.09*** |
| Interest Rate Futures (%) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00*** |
| Interest Rate Forwards (%) | 0.84 | 2.87 | 0.01 | 0.33 | 0.83*** |
| Interest Rate Swaps (%) | 2.28 | 5.49 | 0.07 | 1.00 | 2.21*** |
| Pay Fixed Swaps (%) | 1.06 | 2.76 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.06*** |
| Loans (%) | 68.69 | 13.22 | 60.84 | 19.11 | 7.84*** |
| Deposits (%) | 82.60 | 6.86 | 82.72 | 13.41 | -0.13** |
| Uninsured/Deposits (%) | 26.56 | 14.51 | 20.44 | 13.16 | 6.12*** |
| Reserves (%) | 4.16 | 5.64 | 5.07 | 7.19 | -0.91*** |
| Total Equity (%) | 10.85 | 2.70 | 13.02 | 10.88 | -2.18*** |
| Common Equity Tier 1 (%) | 10.18 | 2.37 | 12.75 | 10.31 | -2.57*** |
| Maturity Gap Ratio (%) | 12.15 | 13.58 | 6.08 | 13.97 | 6.07*** |
| Non Performing Assets (%) | 0.06 | 0.20 | 0.08 | 0.23 | -0.02*** |
| HTM+AFS Securities (%) | 17.29 | 12.27 | 19.92 | 16.50 | -2.63*** |

Summary of Hedging vs. Non-Hedging Banks

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- ▶ More loans, uninsured deposits, less equity

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- 2) Banks increase hedging activity to mitigate losses in fixed-income portfolios
- 3) Banks reduce hedging activity when gains increase in fixed-income portfolios
- 4) Banks increase hedging activity due to funding risks from unsecured deposits

Empirical Model and Variable Selection

$$H = g(X_1, X_2, D)$$
$$P(D = 1) = f(X_1, X_2)$$

H is the hedging decision

X_1 are HTM/AFS Losses, uninsured deposits, interest rate guidance

X_2 are established variables such as maturity GAP and MBS originations (Kim, 2021)

$D = 1$ if bank fails

Purnandanam (2007) models this as endogenous, but it may not be if banks anticipate forward interest rate guidance

H1: Trading vs. Hedging Interest Rate Derivatives

- ▶ As rates \uparrow , trading sells swaps (like SVB)

| | <i>Dependent Variable: $\Delta IRD_{i,t}$</i> | | | |
|----------------------|--|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | <i>Rising Rates_t</i> | | <i>Falling Rates</i> | |
| | <i>Trading</i> | <i>Hedging</i> | <i>Trading</i> | <i>Hedging</i> |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| $\Delta Rates_t$ | -0.007*** (-4.1) | -0.002 (-0.35) | -0.02*** (-3.75) | -0.057*** (-9.31) |
| $\Delta Rates_{t-1}$ | -0.002 (-0.76) | 0.003 (0.6) | -0.002 (-0.47) | 0.006 (0.95) |
| $\Delta Rates_{t-2}$ | 0.007** (2.14) | -0.004 (-0.48) | -0.004 (-0.46) | -0.022** (-2.05) |
| $\Delta Rates_{t-3}$ | -0.003 (-1.33) | 0.003 (0.78) | 0.001 (0.35) | 0.005 (1.09) |
| Observations | 4,632 | 23,114 | 2,837 | 14,482 |
| Interest Rates | 10Y Swap | 10Y Swap | 10Y Swap | 10Y Swap |
| Bank FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Bank Clusters | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Time Clusters | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.07 |
| Within R^2 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.05 | 0.09 |

H1: Trading vs. Hedging Interest Rate Derivatives

- ▶ As rates \uparrow , trading sells swaps (like SVB)
- ▶ As rates \uparrow , hedging may be bank-level, not macro

| | <i>Dependent Variable: $\Delta IRD_{i,t}$</i> | | | |
|----------------------|--|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | <i>Rising Rates_t</i> | | <i>Falling Rates</i> | |
| | <i>Trading</i> | <i>Hedging</i> | <i>Trading</i> | <i>Hedging</i> |
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Empirical Model for H2 and H3

- ▶ Time fixed effects λ_t accounts for borrower hedging
- ▶ Controls for maturity gap, size, and deposits

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\text{Hedging IRD}_{it}}{\text{Assets}_{it}} &= \alpha_i + \lambda_t + \frac{\text{Held-to-Maturity Security Losses}_{i,t}}{\text{Assets}_{it}} \\ &+ \frac{\text{Available-for-Sale Security Losses}_{i,t}}{\text{Assets}_{it}} \\ &+ \frac{\text{Maturity Gap}_{it}}{\text{Assets}_{it}} + X'\beta + \varepsilon_{it} \end{aligned}$$

H2 and H3: Bank-Level Losses

| | <i>Dependent Variable: Hedging_{i,t}</i> | | | |
|--|--|---------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | <i>All Periods</i> (1) | <i>All Periods</i> (2) | <i>Rising Rates</i> (3) | <i>Falling Rates</i> (4) |
| <i>HTM Losses_{i,t}</i> | 0.78*** (3.35) | 2.36*** (3.82) | 0.768*** (2.98) | 1.104 (1.19) |
| <i>AFS Losses_{i,t}</i> | 0.665*** (3.72) | 1.383*** (2.73) | 0.66*** (3.1) | 1.572*** (3.78) |
| <i>Maturity Gap_{i,t}</i> | 0.082*** (4.35) | 0.022 (1.01) | 0.113*** (4.99) | 0.035 (1.7) |
| <i>Mortgage Originations_{i,t}</i> | | 0.237*** (4.32) | | |
| <i>Log (Assets)_{i,t}</i> | 0.021** (2.22) | -0.005 (-0.46) | 0.025** (2.26) | 0.027** (2.29) |
| <i>Deposits_{i,t}</i> | -0.11*** (-2.81) | -0.07 (-1.59) | -0.114*** (-2.7) | -0.12*** (-2.73) |
| Observations | 37,763 | 7,919 | 20,967 | 15,502 |
| Bank FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Time FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Bank Clusters | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Time Clusters | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.78 | 0.92 | 0.76 | 0.80 |
| Within R^2 | 0.02 | 0.10 | 0.03 | 0.02 |

Heckman Two-Stage Selection Model

- ▶ Addresses selection bias
- ▶ IRD and non-IRD banks have different characteristics (Sinkey Jr and Carter, 2000; Minton, Stulz, and Williamson, 2009)

| Panel B: 2nd Stage Regression | <i>Hedging Interest Rate Derivatives</i> | | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| <i>HTM Losses_{i,t}</i> | 2.579*** (3.01) | | | 2.546*** (2.99) |
| <i>AFS Losses_{i,t}</i> | | 1.509*** (5.40) | | 1.585*** (5.65) |
| <i>Maturity Gap_{i,t}</i> | | | 0.118*** (7.01) | 0.154*** (8.37) |
| Selected Obs | 34,944 | 34,944 | 36,097 | 34,944 |
| Nonselected Obs | 138,572 | 138,572 | 139,596 | 138,572 |
| Controls | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Wald χ^2 | 990.13 | 973.03 | 884.35 | 1,020.51 |

Held to Maturity Losses - Asymmetric?

- ▶ Rates ↑ Muni/MBS hedging ↑;

Dependent Variable: Hedging IRD_{i,t}

| | <i>All Periods</i> (1) | <i>All Periods</i> (2) | <i>Rates Rising</i> (3) | <i>Rates Falling</i> (4) |
|---|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| <i>HTM Losses on Treasuries_{i,t}</i> | 1.600 (0.74) | 1.199 (0.56) | 0.882 (0.4) | -4.244 (-0.34) |
| <i>HTM Losses on Non-MBS Agencies_{i,t}</i> | -1.126 (-1.15) | -1.175 (-1.26) | -1.19 (-1.22) | -1.801 (-0.83) |
| <i>HTM Losses on Munis_{i,t}</i> | 1.063** (2.46) | 1.112** (2.45) | 1.395*** (3.26) | -2.019* (-1.80) |
| <i>HTM Losses on MBS_{i,t}</i> | 1.581*** (3.18) | 1.335*** (2.68) | 1.105** (2.11) | 3.959 (1.77) |
| <i>HTM Losses on ABS & Other_{i,t}</i> | -1.407 (-0.34) | -0.466 (-0.11) | -3.54 (-0.91) | 35.262 (1.49) |
| <i>Maturity Gap_{i,t}</i> | | 0.079*** (4.22) | 0.108*** (4.95) | 0.038* (1.81) |
| <i>Log (Assets)_{i,t}</i> | | 0.02** (2.1) | 0.023** (2.12) | 0.027** (2.24) |
| <i>Deposits_{i,t}</i> | | -0.097*** (-2.52) | -0.098** (-2.37) | -0.115*** (-2.63) |

Available for Sale Losses - Asymmetric Hedging

- ▶ Asymmetric Hedging is more evident for AFS Losses

Dependent Variable: Hedging IRD_{i,t}

| | <i>All Periods</i> (1) | <i>All Periods</i> (2) | <i>Rates Rising</i> (3) | <i>Rates Falling</i> (4) |
|---|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| <i>AFS Losses on Treasuries_{i,t}</i> | -0.026 (-0.05) | 0.185 (0.33) | 0.215 (0.38) | 4.382* (1.78) |
| <i>AFS Losses on Non-MBS Agencies_{i,t}</i> | 0.783* (1.93) | 1.053*** (2.56) | 0.94** (2.08) | 3.814*** (2.7) |
| <i>AFS Losses on Munis_{i,t}</i> | 0.357** (1.98) | 0.507*** (2.64) | 0.521** (2.21) | 1.107 (1.33) |
| <i>AFS Losses on MBS_{i,t}</i> | 0.766*** (3.11) | 0.862*** (3.54) | 0.881*** (3.44) | 1.372 (1.48) |
| <i>AFS Losses on ABS % Other_{i,t}</i> | 1.391* (1.7) | 1.283 (1.56) | 1.452 (1.57) | 0.048 (0.04) |
| <i>Maturity Gap_{i,t}</i> | | 0.081*** (4.3) | 0.111*** (4.94) | 0.035* (1.7) |
| <i>Log (Assets)_{i,t}</i> | | 0.021** (2.2) | 0.024** (2.23) | 0.027** (2.32) |
| <i>Deposits_{i,t}</i> | | -0.107*** (-2.77) | -0.111*** (-2.65) | -0.117*** (-2.67) |

Security Losses and Funding Risks

- ▶ Hedging increases when Losses & Uninsured Deposits Increase

| | <i>Dependent Variable: Hedging_{i,t}</i> | | | | | |
|---|--|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| | <i>All Periods</i> | | <i>Rates Rising</i> | | <i>Rates Falling</i> | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| <i>HTM Losses_{i,t} × Uninsured Deposit %_{i,t}</i> | 3.107** (2.38) | | 3.408** (2.53) | | -0.757 (-0.14) | |
| <i>AFS Losses_{i,t} × Uninsured Deposit %_{i,t}</i> | | 0.652 (1.36) | | 0.535 (1.06) | | 1.299 (0.79) |
| <i>HTM Losses_{i,t}</i> | -0.454 (-0.91) | | -0.6 (-1.17) | | 1.246 (0.73) | |
| <i>AFS Losses_{i,t}</i> | | 0.456** (1.99) | | 0.48* (1.84) | | 1.225** (2.3) |
| <i>% Uninsured Deposits_{i,t}</i> | 0.038** (2.00) | 0.038** (2.00) | 0.047** (2.35) | 0.048** (2.32) | 0.009 (0.34) | 0.012 (0.46) |
| Observations | 33,979 | 33,979 | 18,907 | 18,907 | 13,841 | 13,841 |
| Controls | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Bank FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Time FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Bank Clusters | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Time Clusters | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Adjusted <i>R</i> ² | 0.78 | 0.78 | 0.76 | 0.76 | 0.80 | 0.80 |
| Within <i>R</i> ² | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.02 |

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4. SVB selling its remaining hedging swaps in 2022 Q4 for profit transitioned hedging IRDs to trading
 - ▶ Evidence suggests that may be unusual enough to warrant a reclassification

Conclusion

Thank you for coming! I appreciate any and all comments!